There is a fuller article in the Bhopal Marathon at www.bhopalmarathon.org, page 33 and
documents mentioned are at www.bhopal.org/discoverypapers.
When Union Carbide (India)
Ltd (UCIL) was created, Eduard Muñoz was appointed MD. Later, in a sworn
affidavit to a New York court he described how he had opposed the parent UCC
plan to install three large storage tanks for methylisocyanate (MIC). His
opinion, based on safety and economics, had been that only a small storage tank
was needed.
He was overruled by UCC
heads and so three large storage tanks were installed, and this, according to
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research was the most critical factor
in the disaster. At times there would be 90 tonnes of methylisocyanate stored.
It started in 1974 when India
passed a law that no foreign company could own more than 40% of a company in India.
UCC had 60% of UCIL’s shares and managed to persuade the government that it
should be exempted as it was aiding the so called ‘green revolution’. Thus
exemption was granted and UCC retained overall control though with reduced
share capital.
However, they decided that the
proposed state-of-the-art facility was too expensive and installed what they
themselves admitted internally had not been proven. This involved batch
processing and a large storage capability. With poor harvests and monsoons
demand for pesticides fell and the plant started losing money but UCC realised
it would be impossible to sell parts of the factory because of the technology
used.
Workers
in the factory were continuously concerned about safety and in December 1981
Ashraf Khan was critically injured in the phosgene plant and died in hospital.
After this UCC sent in a
team for a safety inspection. The report, in May 1982, identified 30 major
hazards and 31 others. 10 of the major ones were in the phosgene/MIC unit. As a
result UCC improved safety at its USA plant but not at Bhopal. In fact they
increased cost cutting measures.
Between 1980 and 1984, the
workforce was halved and a single operator had to oversee the control room with
about 70 panels, indicators and controllers. Safety training was reduced from
six months to two weeks and the manuals were in English which many staff could
not read.
In a plant such as this, dealing
with corrosive chemicals, all the pipes, valves and pumps should be inspected
fortnightly and replaced every six months. Here, under directions from UCIL’s
holding company in Hong Kong, inspections were rare, replacements could take
two years and even then parts were recycled instead of new.
In February of 1984 a safety
audit of the sister plant in USA raised concerns that a runaway reaction could
occur and there would be no way to prevent catastrophic failure. Ensuring the
tanks are kept at 0°C slows down the reaction and would thus give time for
action and evacuation.
The plant in USA was
improved but in Bhopal they did nothing and did not even pass on the warnings.
Instead they actually turned off the refrigeration to save more money – about $37
a day.
Added to this, the factory
site is in a densely populated area of northern Bhopal and UCC had no plan for
the evacuation of people from their homes and there had been no training in
this either.
Rajkumar Keswani, a local
journalist, had been following progress at the factory and written several
articles in the press as well as a letter to the Chief Minister which was
ignored. His last article was published only weeks before the disaster.
So it appears that a trail
of unproven technology, inadequate safety systems and storing a huge quantity
of lethal gas compounded by ignored warnings, negligence and cost cutting
endangered a whole city and led to the disaster on that night.
Even then, after the
explosion, UCC immediately claimed that it had no authority or control over the
plant’s design or operation and thus had no responsibility. They attempted first
to put the blame on Sikh terrorists and then on an unnamed disgruntled
employee. Both claims were rejected by India’s Central Bureau of Investigation
which said it was “an attempt to obscure the material facts of this action with
irrelevant facts, improbable detail and blatant misrepresentation.”
On the morning of the
explosion, with doctors frantic for information, a senior magistrate had to go
to the factory to be told the gas was methylisocyanate. The Chief Medical
Officer Dr Loya claimed the gas was only an irritant and not fatal. He also
said that if UCC had not hidden the dangers, the population would have marched
against the factory.
